Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation Among Organizations

by James A. Kitts, Diego Leal, Will Felps, Thomas M. Jones, Shawn L. Berman

Supplementary materials and resources

Mathematical supplement

Click here to download mathematical appendix

Simulation program

This is an agent-based model (ABM) from Kitts, Leal, Felps, Jones, and Berman (2016), which is based on the spatial Prisonerís Dilemma (PD) from Nowak and May (1992). The model allows the user to understand how the gains for exploiting cooperative partners (Greed) and the cost of cooperating with exploitive partners (Fear) impact the dynamics of cooperation in a population of agents arranged on a regular lattice. The model shows that embedding exchange in networks (in this case, a 2-dimensional grid with Moore neighborhoods) generally leads Greed and Fear to have divergent, interactive, and highly nonlinear effects on cooperation at the population level. It also shows how virtual interventions to Greed and Fear are not symmetric over time.

Click here to download the simulation program (requires Netlogo to run)

Click here to download results data from the regular lattice experiment.

Click here to download results data from the organizational network experiment

Description of the inter-organizational data

We derive the organizational network data from a list of 4,146 board members of 2,450 of the wealthiest US corporations in 2011-12, collected by William Domhoff. We drew an undirected link between any two corporations that share at least one board member in that year. This produced a single giant component of 2,400 corporations (after excluding 50 corporations that were not connected to the others), representing 98% of the original set of corporations.

To request the interorganizational network data used in the article, you can email us: jkitts@soc.umass.edu



The article associated with this agent-based model is published as:

Kitts JA, Leal DF, Felps W, Jones TM, Berman SL (2016) Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among Organizations. PLoS ONE 11(2): e0147264. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147264