by James A. Kitts
Published in American
Sociological Review, 71(2): 235-259, April 2006.
ABSTRACT
Centralized sanctions (selective incentives) and informal norms have
been advanced as distinct solutions to collective action problems. This
article investigates their interaction, modeling the emergence of norms
in the presence of incentives to contribute to collective goods.
Computational experiments show how collective action depends on a
three-way interaction among the value of incentives, rivalness of
incentives (ranging from independence to zero-sum competition), and
group cohesiveness (effectiveness of peer influence). This
investigation shows a broad range of conditions in which social norms
promote the collective good, and thus peer influence complements a
centralized regime of selective incentives. It also shows conditions in
which the two systems clash because incentives lead to antisocial norms
that discourage contributions to collective goods. In these conditions,
we must reconsider the widely predicted relationships of collective
action to selective incentives, social cohesiveness, and second-order
free riding.
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